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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
by Virgil C. Aldriclz 
The instructions, "Don't be so self-conscious," "You should be more 
conscious of yourself," and the like, are interpreted in a variety of ways, 
depending on the context. On the one hand, there are what may be 
called the popular or practical interpretations, and on the other, the 
more sophisticated or theoretically complicated ones. Let me glance first 
at some examples of the practical sort in a by-passing manner, since I 
am interested primarily in the other kind. 
You are at a cocktail party for some dignitary and discover that 
a quantity of hors d'oeuvre dip has been on your beard for some time. 
You become painfully self-conscious, with the form of self-conscious- 
ness called embarrassment. Or you are a wallfIower at the party, not 
because you are homely in appearance, but because you are shy. Shy- 
ness is a built-in, self-negating sort of self-consciousness that tends to 
keep the shy person out of circulation in social situations, perhaps be- 
cause of an unfavorable estimate of himself. Or you may suffer from 
narcissism, being in love with yourself, in a sort of introverted and 
romantic preoccupation with the image of your self, and this too would 
tend to keep you out of the social whirl at the party. Or, opposite 
to all these cases, you might be an exhibitionist, self-conscious in a 
way that puts your self on exhibit at every turn, compulsively. This 
also might get you ostracized, in the end. 
Such examples could easily be multiplied beyond necessity, and I 
do not want to do that. The point is that in all such cases I could 
properly tell you not to be so self-conscious, and you and everybody 
else concerned would quite readiIy get the sense of the instruction, 
in those situations and the like. However, I can't refrain from men- 
tioning one more example. Suppose you are an exhibitionist in the 
above sense and are playing a part in a play on stage. Your job as an 
actor is to engage in a pattern of actions-including speaking, which is 
the most essential and expressive human action of all-that best exhibits 
the person of the character you are playing, ~ o t  your own person or 
self. This requires a studied awareness of the pattern of actions which 
is the medium of the dramatic art. Now if you here make the mistake 
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of being aware of yourself instead, or of putting yourself on exhibit 
as well, thereby drawing attention away from the character you 
playing, the admonishment, "Don't be so self-conscious," would again 
apply. Similar remarks hold for the writer whose style is, as we say, 
"self-conscious," out of too much concern on the part of the author 
to make a show of his own virtuosity at literary composition, at the 
expense of what he is supposed to be portraying in the linguistic medium 
of his art. 
As for the positive instruction, "You should be more conscious of 
yourself," it too has practical interpretations and applications like the 
negative one I've been illustrating. One might direct it at a man with 
bad table manners-"Be more conscious of yourself, watch yourself!* 
--or to one who tends impulsively to give away things that the recipients 
do not need as much as the giver does. But, since it is this positive sofi 
of instruction that readily lends itself to the more theoretically involved 
or sophisticated interpretation I mentioned above and which is the chief 
concern of this essay, I turn from the popular to the philosophical us. 
ages. Of course, the negative instruction, "Don't be so self-conscio~s,~ 
can be taken this way also. The philosophical mystic, for example, has 
quite some use for this, but what he makes of it, as we shall see, is very 
different from what has been made of it in the above cases. Be all this 
as it may, let us attend in what follows to the positive instruction, "You 
should be more conscious of yourself," as an occasion to examine 
what I have called the theoretically involved interpretations, treating these 
as if they express the kind of philosophical self-consciousness that pre- 
vailed at the time. So I proceed with the attempt to give you a bird's- 
eye view of the history of some of these philosophies of self-conscious- 
ness. These, unlike the practical or popular uses of the injunctions to be 
or not to be self-conscious, involve some analysis of self-consciousness, 
and of course this will involve a theory of the self and its self-con- 
sciousness. I want the brief story I am going to tell you of this to impress 
you with the evolutionary continuity or development of this concept, 
through the various theories in chronological order. 
First, of course, Socrates, because as formulated by Plato, he is first. 
In Socrates' heyday, the Sophists were propagating a popular and easy 
sort of subjectivism and scepticism, the sort that the sophomore annoys 
his parents with after a year of college. Not that the arguments of the 
great Sophists for such a view were nearly as immature as the sopho- 
more's. They were so penetrating that they taxed Socrates' powers of 
refutation to the limit, Protagoras, for example,, argued the proposition 
that man is the measure of all things. Each man is the measure of reality 
and truth. To become conscious of one's self was, for Protagoras, to be- 
come conscious of the fact that i t  was a subjective or small container 
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of everything knowable by him. It was this idea of the self and self- 
consciousness that Socrates had to attack. As Plato's hero, he finally 
emerged with the notion, systematically argued, that what is subjective 
or private to the self is not at all essential to it. What is essential 
to it and its salvation is the consciousness of certain eternal objects 
to which any rational mind has access, in the sort of intellectual con- 
templation that the Platonic Socrates identified with knowledge. This 
tended to empty the self of its subjective contents in favor of conscious- 
ness of an objective reality that transcends private experience. Thus, 
oneself was conceived as the intellectual love of timeless and 
objects, and this absorption into eternal entities, by abstract 
makes the self immortal. So the Socratic injunction, "Know 
thyself," turns out, paradoxically, to require the particular self to lose 
itself in a reality that lies beyond the self. True self-consciousness, phil- 
osophically arrived at, thus involves the paradox of self-realization 
through the absorption of the self into something selfless, something 
in which the identity of the particular self, as subject of the experience, 
is lost. The self as subject and subjective is a mere appearance, not ul- 
timately real. 
The note sounded here is not unlike that of the later Christian 
teaching concerning the self and its salvation. There too is the paradox 
of the self dying unto itself, though this time more by faith and love 
than by knowledge or the exercise of reason. (Plato too had said that 
philosophy is learning how to die.) But the Christian orthodox teaching 
places more emphasis on seIfhood as ultimate; I don't want to stress this 
at this point of the story. Rather, it is the echo that Platonism got in 
subsequent mysticism, beginning with Plotinus, that I next draw your 
attention to, In so far as Christian doctrine is mystical, it will be im- 
plicitly included in this notice. So I turn to mysticism. 
According to the mystic, a sustained and educated effort at self- 
consciousness will not only make the particular self vanish into nothing- 
ness in the end, but, in the white radiance of that experience, it wilI 
become clear that the self was really nothing all along, even in the be- 
ginning. Its apparent being will dissolve away into its real nonbeing. 
This is the mystical experience. Since this pilgrim's progress of the soul 
is pictured as a passage from appearance to reality, the nonbeing into 
which it finally sinks, losing its identity like a drop of water in the 
ocean, is judged to be a blessed event-the new birth of the self through 
its annihilation. Here again is the paradox of consummating the self 
by annihilating it. The Oriental mystic has compared this to pouring milk 
into milk, Paraphrasing a passage in the Brahma Sutra, the particular 
self is an apparent modification of an ultimate x. The illusion of this par- 
ticular modification called the self is produced, according to the passage, 
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by the self's unfortunate linguistic activities. It uses language, ]lames, 
and the concepts that go along with these. I t  is this that makes it look 
as if there really are many particular things including the self, deployed 
in time and space. The truth is that these linguistic concoctions are mere 
appearances carved out of an absolute, undifferentiated unity that is 
nameless and ineffable, realized only in mystical experience and about 
which the wise man, the true seer, will keep mum. The current verbal 
practices of Zen Buddhism, with its koans, are aimed at driving home 
this point-breaking through the logical web of language. 
So the instruction, "You should be more conscious of yourself," turns 
out, in this context of theoretical interpretation, to be issued in the hope 
that the self you only seem to be, as an illusory, verbal construct, will 
finally be rejected as full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. Or, if 
you are a self-seeking sort of person, thc mystic might as well say to 
you, 'LD~n ' t  be so self-conscious," and his meaning will be clear in the 
context of his mysticism. 
Now make with me a big jump out of this cosmic, anti-rational mood 
into the scientific ethos that emerged in the West in the sixteenth ten. 
tury and jelled in the seventeenth. We find there that particular selves, 
as subjects of subjective experience, get recognized with a bang, not a 
whimper; but for rather embarrassing reasons. In  fact, all bona fide ex- 
perience begins to look subjective or "inner" in this new Light of Nature 
that, for the first great scientists of this period, revealed the external or 
outer world only as mechanically and mathematically structured. More- 
over, it made this outer realm of matter look more real than the inner 
subjective realm of mind. I t  was in this age that the great dualism be- 
tween mind within, and matter without, emerged with a vengeance. It 
became systematic in Descartes' Meditations, whose hero was his older 
contemporary Galileo, and fifty years later in John Locke who spoke 
reverently of "the incomparable Mr. Newton." 
Under the impact of the new scientific world-picture, there seemed to 
be no place for mind-with-its-animation in the real external world in 
space and time. Space, said Descartes, is the essence of matter, and 
mind has no spatial properties at all. It  is nowhere at all. Thus it has 
no affinity, no kinship, with the real external world of nature, in space. 
Thus it is not really possible for the self as mind to take the plunge 
of mystical experience out of itself into the vast ocean around it of the 
Not-Self. Thus each self is stuck with itself, confined to its own sub- 
jective contents. Strictly speaking, it has no direct experience of any- 
thing but these subjective contents or psychological states. Even its clear- 
cst and most distinct idcas that are put to work in its most responsible 
mental operations called scientific research are subjective. We must as- 
scme that these, when mathematically formulated, correspond to the 
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realities of the external world, but, as Descartes argued, we do 
Dot know that there is any such correspondence without a supernatural 
pirantee. And it was precisely the concept of the supernatural that was 
getting its props knocked out from under it by the new scientific world- 
picture. Descartes had to resort to nonscientific arguments for God's ex- 
istence in a desperate effort to keep the supernatural on its props de- 
spite the swelling tide of scientific naturalism. He did this because God 
alone could save natural knowledge from the swelling tide of scepticism. 
Since only abstract, mathematical thinking had some chance of achiev- 
ing true correspondence with reality external to mind, the doctrine of the 
&eer subjectivity of all sense-perceptual, imaginative and spiritual ex- 
perience emerged with a new force. These are just so much smog com- 
pared with the scientific metrics of clear and distinct concepts. Thus, 
curiously, the new science tended to agree with the old mysticism on 
one count. The seIf is chock full of illusory and misleading appearances 
that simply must be seen through if there is to be anything like an ap- 
proximation to knowledge and truth. (Bacon's idols of the mind.) But, 
according to the new science, the emotional escape in mystical expe- 
rience from these deceptive appearances that mystics of India call maya 
is not really possible. The mystical experience is a lapse, a fall, from in- 
tellectual grace; not a salvation. Having it only augments the illusion. 
Or even just trying to have it. 
So, in this brave new world, the injunction, "Know thyself," or, "You 
should be more conscious of your self," is a warning not to be taken 
in by its "subjective contents" that have no chance of objective cor- 
respondence with the demented external world of mechanical happen- 
ings under geometrical and causal laws. But even the mathematical 
ideas by which you have a better chance of achieving such correspondence 
are subjective contents of the self. So it is still by a selective kind of in- 
trospection that you may come to know something outside the self, i.e., 
by attending to its most clear and distinct subjective contents. To put 
the matter tersely, one may say that, according to this way of thinking 
and theorizing about the self, self-consciousness is inescapable. You can't 
help being self-conscious. You never really have direct access to, or get 
directly at, anything but the subjective contents of your self or mind, 
whether in perception or conception. Your own impressions and ideas 
are all you ever encounter anywhere in the field of your experience 
and thought. You are caught in the inner privacy of yourself, and not 
even a Houdini can get out of this trap. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Scottish sceptic David 
Hume had driven home the negative implications of this new dualism. 
The embryo of scepticism curled in its womb was brought to light 
, and maturity by his treatment. We do not experience things, but only 
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our impressions of things. And all our ideas, comprising such knowledge 
as we have, derive from just these impressions, not from things. Even 
mental things like ourseIves or minds are not directly experienced. only 
certain impressions of them are, impressions that suggest they must be, 
long to something called self or mind. (Nobody ever simply sees or hears 
or feels his own mind per se, or any other.) Just as other impressions 
seem to be connected with material things outside the mind. So, strictly 
speaking, instead of knowledge of things either material or mental, there are 
only pseudo-ideas of these. The genuine ideas, deriving from impressions 
only, reveal only the kinds and orders of impressions. Not of things, 
either material or mental. The rest is just sheer guesswork under psycho, 
logical laws of association of ideas, not knowledge. The term "guessworp 
here is due to Bertrand Russell, who also was a sceptic in one of the 
stages of his development. In short, both subjectivism and objectivism 
are hamstrung as meaningless, by Hume's analysis, if subjectivism in. 
volves a claim to knowledge of the self that has the impressions. 
After Hume had done his work, or if I may play with his pet term, 
made his "impression" on the mind of the eighteenth century, it was 
clear that if there is anything like a game of knowledge-of-things to be 
played and won, some philosopher with a new angle, or a hitherto un- 
played card up his sleeve, would have to sit down to the conceptual 
poker table. Someone who had absorbed the scientific ethos through the 
pores and, while understanding and respecting it, had premonitions of 
another ethos to come. Someone who would find intolerable what the 
sceptic had done to the age-old maxim, "Be conscious of your self" 
("Know thyself"). If Hume was right, it was impossible to obey it. 
The best one could do to preserve one's sanity, after trying hard to obey 
it, was to follow Hume's own example, You stop trying, and turn for re- 
lief to play a game of backgammon-which, like poker, is also a game 
of chance, As is the game of knowledge. 
Another thing was also clear at this stage. The self or the mind had 
by this time a big premium on it, though it had been used as a waste- 
basket to contain human values and purposes that had no place in the 
executive order of the external world. The evolution of thought from 
Descartes to Berkeley, who was just before Hume, had involved a re- 
treat into the inner realm of mind from the outer realm of material 
things. Thus had thiigs been subjectified into contents of the mind, in 
so far as any experience or knowledge of them is at all possible. Now, 
if by "the mind" here you mean your mind, then you are a solipsist, 
and such a view simply won't do. The solipsist argues that only he and 
his self-contained world really exist. Of such a view even the sceptic 
Hume had said that, though it admits of no refutation, yet it produces 
no conviction, But I think we have an informal sort of refutation in the 
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wbbnsical story about the French solipsist who complained, in a letter 
to Bertrand Russell, that nobody else would accept his excellent argu- 
meats showing that only he, the Frenchman, exists. Even the solipsist 
the company of other selves, when he argues. I£ he has any argu- 
ment at all. So solipsism is self-refuting. The notion of arguing with one- 
self will not help here, since one cannot argue with himself until he has 
learned to argue, and this one does at first with another self. 
Nevertheless, the self had by this time become the focal point on 
&ich the being of anything knowable and experienceable seemed to de- 
pend. How then to reinstate things as genuine and public objects of ex- 
perience and knowledge "out there," without abandoning the notion of 
their containment by, and dependence on, a self or mind? That is, by re- 
placing the false subjectivism with a true one? A formula for this had 
to be found as the only way out of the cramp of the new emphasis on 
the privacy of the experience of each-little-self-unto-itself. 
and the German romanticists after him found the formula and 
it with a vengeance, beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth 
ry and on up to the middle of the nineteenth. I shall be atrociously 
about this development, with some pangs of conscience. The 
formula is: enlarge the self into the Absolute Self or Mind, and let 
your self and mine be finite parts of it, with Absolute Mind as their 
real essence. Then there will again be an objective-this time spiritual 
--environment for our selves containing public realities independent of 
my self and yours, and to be experienced and known by us when our 
experiencing and thinking is responsible. The disciplines that make these 
responsible and adequate to the task of coping with this spiritual reality 
are the humanities, not the sciences. Not even the science of pure mathe- 
matics. The blessing, indeed salvation, of true insight into the nature of 
things comes most effectively through the arts, especially literature, with 
poetry as the essence, more essential even than religion, though this too 
is more revealing than science. But, you will say, these humanistic dis- 
ciplines are subjective expressions of imagination and feeling. Of course 
they are, and that precisely is why they serve the purpose of understand- 
ing and knowledge of the real world better than the intellectual abstrac- 
tions of scientific investigation. You must remember that we live, move, 
and have our being in the Absolute Self, an all-inclusive Subject or Mind. 
That is why the subjective disciplines are on top, in the hierarchy of 
the disciplines. One propcrly goes up, ascends, to them, and down to 
the derivative and deteriorated view of things in the sciences. The 
sciences are at the bottom, concerned as they are with abstractions that 
make the spiritual realities around us look like inanimate and mechan- 
ical objects. To shake off such illusions, one turns advisedly, say, to 
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Tintern Abbey for Wordsworth's reminder that we are in The Presence 
Or to Hegel's philosophy of the World Spirit. 
In philosophy, this sort of anti-scientific world-view waned after., 
even before-Schopenhauer's death in 1860. It had a sort of revival 
through the turn of the century in British, American, and Italian Nee. 
idealism, and then again ceased to have much influence. It is in this 
quiescent state at present, though you can still feel its pulse if you put 
your finger in the right places-on those few individuals who are func. 
tioning as a saving remnant in honor of one of the great traditions in 
philosophy. 
But what about the interpretation of our imperatives of self-conscious. 
ness in the context of such a theory? There they tended to feature the 
all-pervasive Absolute Ego, one way or another. The main point was 
that our finite, fluctuating selves, our little selves, tend to coalesce with 
this larger Self, even to be it, when they think and act as responsibly 
as they can. In fact, such conduct is the activity of the same Larger 
Self within us all. So it becomes important for us to be or realize 
this great potential, in the consciousness that this is what we ultimately 
are, our real being. Thus the instruction, "Don't be so self-conscious," 
would read, "Don't be so aware of (so stuck with) the little self that 
you really are not." And, "Be more conscious of your self, know thy- 
self," would go, "Become aware of the Larger Self you most truly 
are." Since all this draws attention to real being---or has "ontologicaI 
import7'-such imperatives were boiled down into the single "Be your- 
self!" "Sei was du bist!" Your real self. What you really are. Self- 
consciousness of this expanding and more and more inclusive sort, that 
progressively reveals the Absolute Self as its essence, was the theme with 
variations in the romantic movement. Philosophically speaking, it cul- 
minated in Hegel in the first half of the Iast century. Its literary ex- 
pression took on many forms, including that of the "existential mood" 
in which the great Russian novelists also participated. In this form, 
darkened with the tragic consciousness of what it is to be a man, the 
romantic spirit is still quite alive and to be reckoned with, even in com- 
munist Russia. Remember Pasternak, ostracized by The Party for his 
heresy of the anti-scientific world-view expressed in his poetry. (His 
novel Dr. Zhivago was also a poem, plainly against the machinations 
-and I mean also the "machine-ations" of The Party-of dialectical ma- 
terialism. ) 
Now, in quick retrospect, you can see that the story has been of a 
tendency at first, in the early Greek period and subsequent mysticism, 
to lose the self in what is wholly Not-Self; and then, in the modem 
scientific and subsequent romantic period, the tendency either to get 
stuck sceptically with the little self or to escape from this by finding 
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fie self in the world of the true, Larger Self. (The term "larger self" 
is, by the way, due to Harvard's Josiah Royce, in his heyday at the 
mm of our century.) In short, the picture we get, in retrospect, is of 
two mighty opposites: non-subjectivism against subjectivism. (I say 
gbon-subjectivism" instead of "objectivism" because, e.g., mysticism is 
non-subjectivistic but not objectivistic. Indeed, it denies the reality of any 
including Plato's eternal Forms.) 
An impartial yet deeply concerned view of this impasse, activated by 
the question, "Which view is the right one?" has, mainly in the last 
thirty-five years, generated a new kind of philosophical self-consciousness, 
a language-consciousness. Indeed, the predicament required it, as the 
next new angle or card to be played if the game was not to be abandoned 
at the dead end it had reached. At this time, philosophical self-con- 
sciousness began to emerge as language-consciousness. The feeling grew 
among the philosophers that they had unconsciously had their say out 
of selves and worlds structured by the linguistic forms they were using 
and being used by. "Linguistic" here does not mean what it means to 
linguists or to lexicographers. It has a deeper meaning that does greater 
justice to the power of language to order the realm in which a man, 
as a man, is active, stylizing everything he does even when he is not 
actually using the language. This notion of language as a constitutive 
form, a form of life, modifying things even in the field of perception, 
not just conception, now has currency among language philosophers in 
quite different camps. (Even Heidegger in existentialism and Merleau- 
Ponty in phenomenology.) Notice the curious agreement here with the 
ancient mystic's view of language. The mystic had aIso asserted the 
power of language to create and order the world of diverse things 
that every man is aware of. But for the mystic this was not reality. 
Reality was the undifferentiated continuum or unbroken unity back of 
the multiple appearances. So he rejected language. Not so the new phi- 
losophers of language. For them, discarding language is throwing the 
baby out with the bath, since, as Waismann said, reality is realized 
in the forms of language-in-action, as character is in a face or in a 
pattern of human actions, of which language-using is the greatest and 
most refined. Man is best defined as a language-using animal-animal 
symbolicurn-since his language is the soul of him. It is this that dis- 
tinguishes him from the other animals. Moreover, it is this that dis- 
tinguishes between kinds of men, both culturally speaking and accord- 
ing as they are primarily scientists or artists or religious people or 
simply men of action. The language of science is the soul of the scien- 
tist, the language of poetry of the poet, and so on. Thus there is a 
need for a nonspecial or neutral account of a11 these in their various 
relationships, bringing to light the logical grammar of each, formal and 
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informal, and it is the philosopher's job to adopt this new spirit of 
high neutrality and use language in a nonspecial way in the accountb 
It is not an easy job because such neutrality must be highly disciplined 
or cultivated if it is to bear fruit. 
My story-my plot, if you like--has had a beginning and a middle, 
You can feel that it has been ending through the last page or two, 
I shall say "period" to it by finally mentioning a few names with the 
related key ideas, all in this new linguistic ethos. 
It was Cassirer who, in his philosophy of symbolic forms, got beyond 
the traditional dialectical idealism by giving it a twist that has been 
calIed Neo-Kantian. Kant's idealism had been more critical and cap 
tious than Hegel's, so has had more influence on the developments 
I am now speaking of, in the end. Cassirer made much of the language 
of myth, of art, of science, of religion, treating these as symbolic forms 
that structure autonomous worlds under different criteria of intelligibility, 
Thus did he multiply the constitutive forms of life and its "objects" 
beyond the few that Kant recognized or ever dreamt of in his phi- 
losophy. Concurrently, the logical positivist Carnap-who, by the way, 
like Cassirer, began as a continental European-drew a picture of the 
logical structure of the world (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) as a func- 
tion of the language of science only. Other modes of expression have 
only emotive meaning, or imperative. They do not give us true or false 
descriptions of any world. This has been called "scientism," though it 
is a more sophisticated and less offensive sort than the popular critics 
realize. For example, the logical positivist would reject as rank non- 
sense the remark that only matter is ultimately real. Such talk has no 
place in science proper, or anywhere else, according to logical positivism. 
Then there is Wittgenstein who, like Cassirer and the earlier German 
idealists, gives us a more humanistic account of the language we live 
and think by, though in a more detailed or less systematic way. This 
has infuriated Russell who is more inclined toward scientism. Some of 
the theorists under Wittgenstein's influence have been accused by their 
positivistic or scientistic associates of having a leg even in existential- 
ism (Hare). That is how informal or mercurial Wittgenstein's enigmatic 
pronouncements are. I am speaking of course of the maturer Wittgen- 
stein who, when he became a man, put away the childish things he 
said earlier as a logical atomist, positivistically inclined. Very few of 
his critics have got the full significance of this awakening out of his 
earlier dogmatic slumber, and no philosopher has ever been as subtly 
imaginative and suggestive in any such awakening, not even Kant whom 
Hume jolted out of his dogmatic slumber. But Wittgenstein is partly 
to blame for the misunderstanding, perhaps even for the trivialities that 
some of his own disciples have spawned in his name. To prevent 
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tbat-if it's worth preventing-he should have told them more sys- 
tematically what he meant. But it is possible that he would not have got 
across as much of what he meant as he actually did communicate, if! 
he had been more explicit. 
Just two samples, in conclusion, of the sorts of things that Wittgen- 
steh did say. He had a situational, almost organic conception of lan- 
guage. The terms of the language come to life, as he loved to say, in 
live and working connections with one another, and with the situ- 
,tion of their use. Thus there are families or clusters of phrases that 
go together in the living language, and that become Limp, or meaning- 
less and perplexing, when their organic connections are broken. This 
happens when they are put into combinations in which their informal 
logic does not allow them to survive. Their animation, which is their 
meaning, then departs from the words, like the anima or the breath 
from a dying body, leaving it inanimate-a mere "physical object." 
But let me now give you the promised examples. Suppose I say, 
like Descartes, that I could, whiie lecturing in class, be asleep and only 
dreaming that I am lecturing. This seems at least to be meaningful, and 
its truth to be an abstract possibility. But notice that the term "dream- 
ing" has live and working connections with "awakening" and "able 
to report the dream upon awakening." It also ties in closely with non- 
verbal aspects of the situation of its use. A student might significantly 
think that I am sleepwalking or sleep-standing here before him, and 
that I am sleep-talking, if there were something eerie about my manner 
of speaking, and my movements somewhat mechanical or abstract, like 
those of the principal actor-shite-in a Japanese Noh play who im- 
personates a dead man that has temporarily come halfway out of the 
total inanimation of death to convey an urgent message. But is the situa- 
tion like that in my daily classroom lectures? If not, then the phrase, 
"Maybe Aldrich is dreaming," has no working connection with the situa- 
tion and so is not in use-it has no assertive force-despite appear- 
ances. I t  is such "appearances" that the new philosophers of the language 
we live by are taking stock of, in what Austin has called the phenome- 
gy of language. 
s for my own pronouncements about the state I am in, the informal. 
og~c governing the use of "dreaming" makes it logically impossible for 
me to say to someone that I am asleep and dreaming, and to mean it. 
I can say and mean that I am awake, but not that I am asleep and 
aming. If I am lying on a couch and you ask me if I am sleeping, 
answering "Yes" could at best be a joke. Moreover, since our dreams 
couched in, textured by, unspoken language, and since our "dream- 
' goes with "can tell the dream," the concept of dreaming as ap- 
d, say, to a dog becomes problematic. 
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What Descartes did with the term "dreaming" was to cut it loose 
from all such connections that keep it alive with meaning, or on which 
its real use depends, this use being the meaning. Thus he was, un, 
consciously, simply toying with the term and intrigued by the imagery 
of what it is to be awake or dreaming that language conjures up when 
it "idles" in this way, tempting one to mistake these images for the 
meaning of the term or phrase and thus to suppose that some weird 
and intractable possibility forever confronts us, 
These are relatively trivial examples of what the new phenomenologists 
of language are doing. But they do illustrate the procedure in current 
philosophical investigations of the language of science, morals, art, and 
religion, where the findings are more important. Sometimes the moral 
to be made about the important cases is more clearly seen, at first, in 
the trivial. 
I said that Descartes was "unconsciously" just toying with the term 
"dreaming." This gets us back to the theme of my essay. Well, the 
present and new notion of the self and self-consciousness, philosophically 
construed, might be described as sensitivity to the logic of language which 
is our form of life since it institutes the self with its practices, includ- 
ing what I like to call "plain talk" and the more sophisticated or 
special languages of science, religion, etc., and their relations to one an- 
other. I say "sensitivity to" instead of "concept of" because such con- 
sciousness of our life-situation, including the modus operandi of the lan- 
guage we live by, is more of a feel for it, a watching and a hearing 
it at work, than a concept of it to be defined. This is one reason why 
Wittgenstein talked suggestively and sometimes enigmatically about our 
language as our soul or our form of life, instead of framing concep- 
tually clear arguments in support of this situational theory of meaning. 
I conclude, then, that the self that lacks this sort of sense and sensi- 
bility has, by current standards, not realized itself. It  is not self-conscious 
in the required way. 
